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Abstract 
Governments deploy a mix of different innovation policy instruments to stimulate firm-level 
innovation additionality. Firms often receive multiple instruments simultaneously, and 
additionality can depend on interactions within this instrument mix. Depending on how 
consistent different instruments are with one another in terms of their underlying rationales, 
goals, and implementation modes, and how stable this consistency is over time, interaction 
effects can be complementary, substitutive or neutral. Consistency is thus an important means 
of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the instrument mix at achieving policy 
objectives. This has important implications for policymaking. To explore these implications, 
we build a conceptual framework for the ex-ante and ex-post impact evaluation of innovation 
policy instrument mixes. Applying this framework, we construct a unique panel dataset 
capturing the core innovation policy instruments available to firms in Ireland, and employ a 
novel microeconometric technique to estimate the degree of temporal consistency within the 
instrument mix. Our results highlight the importance of temporal dynamics when evaluating 
innovation policy instrument mix consistency. 
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1. Introduction 
 Firms often receive multiple innovation policy instruments simultaneously, meaning 
that the observed impact of innovation policy can depend crucially on interactions within this 
mix of innovation policy instruments (Martin, 2016; Nauwelaers et al., 2009). The nature of 
these interaction effects can be complementary, substitutive, or neutral (Rogge and Reichardt, 
2016; Lanahan and Feldman, 2015; Howlett and del Rio, 2015). This will depend on the 
degree of consistency between different innovation policy instruments in terms of their 
underlying rationales, goals, and implementation modes (Flanagan et al., 2011). Instrument 
mix consistency can be defined as the alignment of individual innovation policy instruments 
in the mix with each other in terms of these underlying characteristics (Rogge and Reichardt, 
2016). Consistency is important to policymakers as it represents a means of enhancing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of an instrument mix at achieving policy objectives (OECD, 
2015b; OECD, 2010; Howlett and Rayner, 2007). However, the nature of instrument 
interactions and their eventual impact on policy outcomes cannot be known ex-ante, and 
therefore represents a challenge for ex-post firm-level evaluation. 
 Beyond theory, the practice of evaluating instrument interactions is seriously 
hampered by the fact that innovation policy instrument mixes are emergent in nature and 
evolve over time, with instruments interacting both within and across multiple levels of 
government, different policy domains, and geographical spaces (Laranja et al., 2008; 
Flanagan et al., 2011; Magro and Wilson, 2013). When considering this complex policy 
system, it is instructive to recall a famous address to the London School of Economics’ 
Financial Markets Research Group delivered in the midst of the global financial crisis by then 
Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Philipp Hildebrand. 
Hildebrand quipped that increasingly complex financial regulation had created a new kind of 
risk: “Risks about risk assessments”, which he conjectured may be “unknowable unknowns” 
3 
 
(Hildebrand, 2008: 7). That is, things that we know little about, and can never hope to 
understand. Thinking about innovation policy complexity in this light provokes an important 
question. Does the level of complexity inherent in innovation policy mix mean that 
instrument interactions are, to echo Hildebrand, unknowable? To answer this question we 
must address what is known about policy instrument mix and what remains unknown and in 
need of unravelling. 
 At the cornerstone of policy mix theory is a focus on the interactions, 
interdependencies and trade-offs between different innovation policies as they affect the 
extent to which policy outcomes are achieved (Cunningham et al., 2016; Flanagan and 
Uyarra, 2016; Flanagan et al., 2011; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2013). A weight of recent 
literature has highlighted the crucial underlying role that consistency among policy 
instrument characteristics plays in moderating policy instrument interactions (Kern et al., 
2017; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016; Uyarra et al., 2016; Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Reichardt 
and Rogge, 2016). However, to date quantitative empirical evaluations have tended to focus 
solely on the relative effectiveness of different combinations of policy instruments, leaving 
consistency unexplored (e.g., Marino et al., 2016; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2015; Czarnitzki and 
Lopes-Bento, 2014). 
 This important cleavage between policy mix theory and evaluation practice exists for 
three primary reasons. First, though many different aspects of the innovation policy 
instrument mix are very well conceptualised in the theoretical literature, no unified 
conceptual framework exists to provide ‘guiding principals’ for impact evaluation. Second, 
the propensity score matching models typically used to facilitate firm-level impact 
evaluations can only infer complementary, substitutive, or neutral interaction effects between 
innovation policy instruments based on the sign and significance of different instrument mix 
regression coefficients. A direct statistical test for the degree of consistency in the instrument 
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mix is missing from the literature. Third, no firm-level micro-dataset has heretofore been 
collected or constructed that captures multiple policy instruments as well as detailed 
information on their underlying characteristics. 
 To address these issues, we make three key contributions. First, we establish a 
conceptual framework for the ex-ante and ex-post impact evaluation of innovation policy 
instrument mixes. Drawing on policy mix theory, we place consistency between interacting 
policy instruments at the heart of this framework. We ensure that the framework is truly 
dynamic by conceptualising feed-back loops between ex-post instrument interactions and 
policy outcomes with ex-ante policy instrument design. In addition, we broaden in a holistic 
manner the scope for policy impact to include social and political outcomes as well as the 
economic outcomes typically considered in the literature, and highlight that these outcomes 
may be unintended as well as intended over the short, medium and long term. Second, we 
apply a novel microeconometric procedure that is uniquely suited to the direct evaluation of 
consistency in the innovation policy instrument mix, meaning that we do not need to rely on 
inference. Following Love at al. (2014), we perform a formal statistical test for static and 
dynamic complementarity, substitution and neutrality in instrument interactions. Finally, our 
third contribution is the construction of a wholly novel panel dataset capturing all of the core 
innovation policy instruments available to firms in Ireland over the period 2006-2014. To 
date, no other empirical setting we are aware of has provided an impact evaluation of changes 
to the innovation policy instrument mix over such a long time period, with such precise 
information on the underlying characteristics of each policy instrument.  
 By working at the confluence of these theoretical, methodological, and empirical 
contributions, we are able to ask an important and timely question: How does the temporal 
consistency of an innovation policy instrument mix affect its observed impact on firm-level 
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innovation? Our findings strongly suggest that the temporal dynamics play a crucial but 
underappreciated role in driving the performance of the innovation policy instrument mix. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the conceptual 
underpinning of the policy mix for innovation, and use this discussion to develop a 
conceptual framework for the impact evaluation of innovation policy instrument mix. 
Drawing on this theoretical discussion, we formulate hypotheses to empirically test. Section 3 
sets out the paper’s empirical setting and describes the microeconometric method used. 
Section 4 presents results. Section 5 considers the policy implications of these results. Section 
6 concludes and highlights some important avenues for further research. 
2. Evaluating the innovation policy instrument mix 
 Innovation policy studies literature increasingly recognises that policy complexity 
severely limits the explanatory power of traditional methods of policy evaluation (Laranja et 
al., 2008; Magro and Wilson, 2013; OECD, 2015b). The concept of policy mix has emerged 
as a means of understanding and mitigating the limitations brought about by policy 
complexity (Flanagan et al., 2011). A cornerstone aspect of policy mix theory is to focus on 
the interactions and trade-offs between different innovation policies as they affect the extent 
to which policy outcomes are achieved (Flanagan et al., 2011). Rogge and Reichardt (2016: 
11) highlight that a “key challenge of any policy mix study concerns the task of setting its 
boundaries, thereby determining the complexity of the studied policy mix as well as its 
observable impact”. This necessitates a discussion of the scope of the policy mix to be 
studied, and the unit of analysis to be used to analyse its impact (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). 
2.1. The policy mix for innovation   
 At the macro-level of the innovation policy  system,  broad  policy  agendas  emanate 
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from a dynamic multi-actor, multi-level and multi-scalar policy process (Matti et al., 2016; 
Uyarra et al., 2016; Aranguren et al., 2016). The policy process will first give rise to policy 
strategy at the meso-level (Quitzow, 2015). Policy strategy involves the establishment of 
policy objectives and the principal plans for achieving them (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). 
Taken together, the objectives and plans of policy strategy provide a roadmap for the 
intended development of the innovation system and thus give important long-term guidance 
for actors within the system (Rogge et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2012). This strategic aspect 
of the policy mix will be operationalised by a variety of different policy instruments at the 
micro-level (Veugelers, 2015). Policy instruments are differentiated by type and design 
feature (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). In addition, individual policy instruments will be 
characterised by distinct rationales, goals, and implementation modes (Flanagan et al., 2011). 
 However, real-world policy mixes also encompass the messy realities of public 
policy, which does not “pursue a single goal or even a coherent and hierarchical set of 
goals—rather it pursues a broad and ever-changing range of more or less explicit and 
implicit, final and intermediate goals and objectives, many of which will conflict in the sense 
that one can only be obtained at the expense or another” (Flanagan et al., 2011: 708). 
Therefore, depending on the context, the underlying characteristics of innovation policy may 
be in need of unravelling to facilitate evaluation. 
 The point at which policy leads most directly to outcomes is at the micro-level. 
Therefore, the micro-level is the appropriate level of analysis for quantitative empirical 
evaluations of the innovation policy instrument mix. There are a wide variety of innovation 
policy instruments available to firms in numerous different countries (Veugelers, 2015), with 
a range of different context-dependent underlying characteristics (Kern et al., 2017). Much 
literature has also described the process of ex-ante policy design to achieve an effective and 
efficient policy mix (Howlett and del Rio, 2015; Kern and Howlett, 2009; Howlett and 
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Rayner, 2007). Quantitative empirical evaluations have shed light on the methodological 
issues involved in the practice of assessing the impact of different combinations of policy 
instruments at the firm-level (Marino et al., 2016; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2015). 
 Therefore, a large body of literature exists that explores different aspects of the 
innovation policy instrument mix. However, there is a need to synthesise the findings from 
these literatures into a unified conceptual framework for the ex-ante and ex-post impact 
evaluation of the policy instrument mix. 
2.2. Firm-level innovation 
 At the micro-level, the appropriate unit of analysis is firm-level innovation (Martin, 
2016; Nauwelaers et al., 2009). The wide variety of policy instruments available to firms is 
indicative of multifaceted policy action governments take to alleviate market and systemic 
failures that are a major barrier to innovation (Bleda and Del Río, 2013; Dodgson et al., 2011; 
Lenihan, 2011). Policy action is characterised by information asymmetries between the 
policymaker and the innovation system which often leads to government failure and the 
misallocation of scarce public resources (Haapanen et al., 2014). From the seminal work of 
Schumpeter (1934) to the modern day (e.g., Fagerberg et al., 2012), firm-level innovation has 
been recognised as an important engine of economic growth (Romer, 1990).  Moreover, it has 
been acknowledged that the dynamic effects of firm-level innovation (Nightingale and Coad, 
2013) foster national competitiveness (Griliches, 1986; Carayannis and Grigoroudis, 2014). 
 In the context of evaluating the impact of innovation policy on firm-level innovation, 
Metcalfe (1995: 31) notes that an important means of creating effective and efficient 
innovation policy is “how well policy makers learn and adapt in light of experience”. 
Evaluations of firm-level innovation are therefore of vital importance in informing this 
process of policy learning and facilitating informed policy experimentation by providing a 
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reliable evidence base (Chaminade et al., 2012). However, Lenihan and Hart (2004) draw 
attention to the fact that policy evaluation is by no means an exact science.  
 In the field of enterprise policy evaluation, Lenihan (2011) has called for more 
holistic evaluation practice which incorporates social and political impacts as well as 
economic impacts, and how these unfold over the short, medium, and long-term. In a similar 
vein, in the innovation policy studies literature, Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia (2012) 
have echoed this call, while also drawing attention to the fact that innovation policy can have 
unintended as well as intended consequences. Unintended consequences can be both positive 
and negative. For example, firm-level evaluations have demonstrated that different forms of 
product, process and organisational innovation are complements (Doran, 2012). Therefore, an 
innovation policy instrument designed to foster new product development in firms may also 
lead to process and/or organisational innovation as a positive unintended consequence. In 
terms of the unintended consequences of a policy instrument mix, it is a-priori unclear how 
these will unfold or interact. However, it is important to conceptualise unintended 
consequences into ex-ante policy design and be aware of them in ex-post policy evaluation. 
 In this regard, Rogge and Reichardt (2016: 1630) note that “widening the system 
boundaries may allow for a more holistic perspective of the problem – both in terms of 
policies and politics – and may thereby enable a better achievement of policy objectives”. 
Give that innovation policy can have social and political as well as economic impacts 
(Lenihan, 2011), Flanagan et al. (2011: 708) provide an important insight: “Policy also plays 
rhetorical and performative functions. Policy-making activity can be an end in itself—being 
seen to have a policy about a problem can play an important political role regardless of 
whether that policy leads to effective action to solve the problem”. In this case, an economic 
impact evaluation may find that a policy had been ‘ineffective’ at creating innovation 
additionality. However, drawing this conclusion would actively hamper policy learning. 
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Rather, ex-post policy evaluation would benefit from a political science perspective in this 
instance. Conceptualising impact evaluation in this holistic way addresses Flanagan at al.’s 
(2011: 705) point that unravelling the underlying characteristics of innovation policy should 
be “the starting point for any evaluation of the effectiveness of policy action—rather than 
theoretical rationales retrospectively mapped onto policy actions”. 
 From this, it is clear that a more holistic approach to policy evaluation, though 
desirable, brings up a number of methodological problems in terms of conceptualising the 
impact of policy instrument mix in an ever expanding system of potential interactions and 
trade-offs. Evaluations of the innovation policy instrument mix can both embrace this more 
holistic perspective as well as remain within feasible boundaries by specifying the scope of 
the evaluation along the dimensions of the policy mix.  
2.3. The boundaries for evaluation: policy mix dimensions 
 Policy instrument interactions occur both within and across four different policy mix 
dimensions: policy space, governance space, geographical space, and time (Flanagan et al., 
2011). Specifying the boundaries for impact evaluation around these dimensions makes 
evaluations both feasible in practice and congruent with theory (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). 
In addition, they also allow the evaluator to know and state exactly what aspects of the policy 
instrument mix are being investigated, what aspects are being held constant, and what aspects 
are not being captured. 
 Within the governance dimension, firms can receive policy instruments from national 
and regional levels of government simultaneously, or from different state agencies operating 
at the same level of governance. Here, instrument interaction effects will be respectively 
defined by the degree of vertical and horizontal consistency among instruments. Similarly, 
policy instruments from many different policy domains can have impacts on firm-level 
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innovation. In the domain of innovation policy, there are numerous instruments that are 
available to firms. However, there are also many instruments emanating from other policy 
domains that that have an implicit or explicit focus on festering innovation. Firms may 
receive enterprise or education policy instruments as well as innovation policy instruments at 
the same time which, by accident or design, will interact and these interactions will produce 
unique effects.  
 Flanagan and Uyarra (2016) have highlighted that time is an under researched policy 
mix dimension. Even individual policy instruments can have internal inconsistencies where 
their rationales, goals, and implementation modes are not aligned, or where they drift out of 
alignment over time (Howlett and Rayner, 2007). In this sense, it is possible to conceptualise 
a policy instrument mix of a single instrument received by the same actor over time – the 
same instrument interacts with itself in subsequent periods (Flanagan et al., 2011). As both 
the instrument and the firm change through time, so will the effects on firm-level innovation 
(Rogge et al., 2011). More typically, instrument mix means a mix of different innovation 
policy instruments, differentiated specifically by type and design feature. Firms can receive 
multiple different instruments simultaneously, and this mix can change over time 
(Cunningham et al., 2016). As with the same policy instrument interaction with itself over 
time, the mix of policy instruments firms receive in one period will interact with the mix of 
policy instruments the same firms receive in the next period (Flanagan et al., 2011; Rogge 
and Reichardt, 2016). This is where knowing the level of temporal consistency among 
innovation policy instruments becomes of vital importance (Reichardt and Rogge, 2016).  
2.4. Consistency among innovation policy instruments 
 Depending on the degree of consistency between different policy instruments in terms 
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 of their underlying rationales, goals, and implementation modes, interaction effects can be 
complementary, substitutive, or neutral (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Lanahan and Feldman, 
2015). Neutral effects will be the result of ‘weak’ consistency, which involves the simple 
absence of conflicts between policy instruments, while ‘strong’ consistency entails 
complementarity and requires policy instruments to mutually reinforce one another’s impact  
(Howlett and del Rio, 2015). When different policy instruments actively hamper each other 
they are inconsistent (Kern and Howlett, 2009) and may substitute. Consistency in the 
instrument mix is therefore an important means of improving the performance of innovation 
policy, and a large part of the policymaker’s role is to design and coordinate the policy 
instrument mix to achieve this (OECD, 2010; Borrás and Edquist, 2013). 
 In this complex policy system, it seems unlikely that consistency will be achieved by 
simply layering one policy instrument on top of another over time (Kern and Howlett, 2009; 
Howlett and Rayner, 2007). Therefore, evaluations of the innovation policy instrument mix 
must take account of the important temporal dimension of instrument mix consistency 
(Flanagan and Uyarra, 2016; Kern et al., 2017). This requires analysis of the dynamics of 
how policy instrument mixes are arrived at, as well as the eventual impact these dynamics 
have on firms’ innovation outcomes (Uyarra, 2010). Given this level of complexity, Rogge 
and Reichardt (2016: 1627) note that “it may be impossible to actually achieve complete … 
consistency”. This statement supports Flanagan et al.’s (2011: 702) contention that “it is 
unrealistic to hope to identify unambiguously ‘good’ mixes”. The multi-actor, multi-level, 
multi-scalar and dynamic nature of the system means that policy instrument mix evaluations 
are always going to relative in nature, and never absolute. In addition, as instruments evolve 
over time the nature and impact of instrument interactions will effect policy design, and thus 
change the nature of the system through recursive feedback loops. Establishing the 
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boundaries for impact evaluation provides a conceptual framework within all of this 
complexity can be managed to effectively foster policy learning. 
2.5. Impact evaluation: Conceptual framework 
 Ex-ante, policy makers can create innovation policy instruments on the basis of type 
and design feature (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). Additionally, how these instruments will 
unfold within and across policy mix dimensions can be specified and how they are likely to 
interact based on their underlying rationales, goals, and implementation modes. However, 
neither the nature nor the effect of instrument interactions can be known until the policy 
instrument mix is deployed at firm-level. Flanagan et al. (2011: 708) note that “[t]he impact 
of a policy depends on when it was implemented and on the path previously followed … 
[p]ublic policies, just like innovations, display irreversibility and path-dependency: they are 
adopted not on a tabula rasa but in a context of pre-existing policy mixes”. Policy outcomes 
achieved with a given policy instrument mix will affect the evolution of the policy instrument 
mix through time (Hoppmann et al., 2014). Therefore, each ex-ante and ex-post phase of 
policy instrument mix evaluation is not discrete, but rather will be characterised by feedback 
loops where ex-post instrument interactions and policy outcomes will inform ex-ante policy 
instrument design. In this sense, the co-evolution of the policy instrument mix and firms’ 
innovation outcomes can only be revealed through dynamic analysis (Reichardt et al., 2016). 
 The conceptual framework for this evaluation of consistency between innovation 
policy instruments and how this impacts firm-level innovation is summarised in Figure 1. 
2.6. Operationalising the conceptual framework  
 Applying this framework in practice brings up an important point highlighted by 
Rogge and Reichardt (2016: 1631): “This leads us to the need for operationalizing policy mix  
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Figure 1. A conceptual framework for the ex-ante and ex-post impact evaluation of 
innovation policy instrument mix 
 
characteristics … which may pose one of the greatest analytical challenge as official 
databases or documents typically do not capture such characteristics”. To overcome this 
challenge we can utilise the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1 to demonstrate how 
an effective instrument mix evaluation can be formulated. 
 Firstly, evaluators must identify what the key research question is in a given context. 
Following this, it is necessary to identify the core innovation policy instruments available to 
firms in the system under examination. These instruments could apply to all firms, or could 
be specific to a certain sector, industry, or type of actor (i.e. SMEs, etc.). The next important 
step is to identify is what policy mix dimension an evaluation is examining, what dimensions 
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are being held constant to facilitate the evaluation, and whether interactions across policy mix 
dimensions are the important feature. 
 Once this process is complete, it is necessary to either collect or construct a dataset 
that captures sufficient information on the underlying rationales, goals, and implementation 
modes of the relevant instruments to operationalise the evaluation. In addition to this, if the 
key research question involves temporal dynamic, then a panel dataset will be required as 
cross-sectional data may obscure the key feature driving observed impact. 
 In Section 3 we apply this operationalisation of our conceptual framework to the 
empirical context of Ireland. Temporal dynamics are particularly important in this context. 
Based on policy mix theory the contextual features on the innovation policy system in Ireland 
(developed in Section 3), we formulate two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: When firms receive a combination of two different innovation policy 
instruments simultaneously, there will be a complementary relationship between them in their 
impact on firm-level innovation. 
Hypothesis 2: When firms receive an innovation policy instrument in one year, and then 
switch to receiving a combination of the initial innovation policy instrument and a new 
innovation policy instrument in the next year, there will be a complementary relationship 
between them in their impact on firm-level innovation. 
 Drawing on the conceptual framework developed in Figure 1, we have specified the 
effective boundaries for our empirical evaluation. Formulating Hypotheses 1 and 2 facilitates 
an examination of the important but under-researched time dimension of the policy mix. 
However, we must make explicit that we are holding policy domain, geographical space and 
level of governance constant and thus not exploring potential interactions across these 
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dimensions. This represents an effective application of our conceptual framework, which can 
serve as a set of ‘guiding principals’ for future evaluations. 
3. Data and methods 
 Having established the effective boundary conditions for empirical analysis, we are 
able to comprehensively test Hypotheses 1 and 2. In doing so, we unravel some of the 
unknown aspects of temporal consistency in the innovation policy instrument mix, and, 
importantly, what affect this has on firm-level innovation. In order to conduct this test in a 
dynamic context, we construct a unique panel dataset based on merging a large annual survey 
with three administrative data sources drawn from Ireland.  
3.1. Empirical setting 
 As a small open economy on the periphery of Europe, there has been a sustained 
policy focus on innovation in Ireland in an effort to achieve and maintain competitive 
advantage (DJEI, 2015b). As such, government innovation policy intervention has been very 
active over a long time period. The European Commission (2016: 6) classes Ireland as a 
“strong innovator”, ranked as the sixth most innovative country in the EU. The β016 Global 
Innovation Index ranks Ireland as the seventh most innovative country worldwide (Cornell 
University et al., 2016). However, gross expenditure on Research and Development (R&D) in 
Ireland currently accounts for 1.51% of Gross Domestic Product, which lags behind the EU 
average of 2.04%.1 An important objective of innovation policy in Ireland is to increase this 
expenditure to 2% by 2020, which, in combination with other policy initiatives, is planned to 
transform Ireland into “[g]lobal innovation leader” (DJEI, 2015b: 6). Alongside these 
features of the innovation policy system, Ireland entered a deep and prolonged economic 
recession after the 2007 global financial crisis. Among other negative consequences, this 
                                                             
1
 Latest figures available are for 2014, see Eurostat: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/R_%26_D_expenditure 
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placed significant pressure on public funding for innovation (DJEI, 2015a) and led to a 
significant increase in the enterprise mortality rate.2 
 Irelands active innovation policy coupled with the recent macroeconomic turbulence 
make it a particularly interesting test bed in which to evaluate how the temporal consistency 
of the innovation policy instrument mix affects its impact on firm-level innovation. However, 
it must be noted that the implications of our analysis are not specific to Ireland. Rather, we 
view Ireland as the laboratory in which we test our hypotheses. The findings derived from 
this analysis unravel the unknown elements of how temporal dynamics within the innovation 
policy instrument mix drive the performance of overall innovation policy, and as such have 
broad and generalisable implications. 
 In order to test our hypotheses in this empirical setting, we must first specify the main 
innovation policy actors operating in the innovation system under examination.  
3.1.1.  Enterprise Ireland 
 Enterprise Ireland (EI) is the state agency responsible for supporting the development 
of indigenous firms in Ireland, with a particular focus on scaling up business through 
innovation to compete in the export market. EI was officially launched 1998, but had existed 
in many different formats since the early 1950s. Indigenous firms in Ireland are 
predominantly small in size3, meaning that EI’s client firms are typically SMEs4. Given that 
SMEs make up 99.7% of active enterprises in Ireland5, it is clear that EI plays an important 
role in the Irish economy. EI competitively  award a   wide   range   of   different   innovation  
                                                             
2
 See CSO: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/bd/businessdemography2014/ 
3
 See CSO: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/bd/businessdemography2014/ 
4
 In the Irish context, SMEs are defined as having less than 250 employees. See CSO: 
http://cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-bii/businessinirelandabridged2012/smallandmediumenterprises/ 
5
 See CSO: http://cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-
bii/businessinirelandabridged2012/smallandmediumenterprises/ 
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policy instruments to firms.6 
3.1.2.  IDA Ireland 
 The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was founded in 1949 with the mission 
of attracting foreign direct investment into Ireland. It is known as IDA Ireland in the present 
day. IDA’s client base is mainly large, multinational corporations. In 2015, IDA client 
companies operating in Ireland employed 187,056 people, 12,600 of which worked in R&D, 
and had total in-house expenditure on R&D of €1.5bn.7 Though IDA’s remit expands beyond 
funding innovation, it is the primary grant awarding agency for innovation in foreign-owned 
firms operating in Ireland. 
3.1.3.  Science Foundation Ireland 
 Science policy is a relatively new feature in Ireland’s innovation system. Science 
Foundation Ireland (SFI) was established in 2003, and is the main funding agency for applied 
and oriented basic research. At the firm-level, this is implemented through a series of public-
private Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). These SFI schemes have been credited with 
attracting significant R&D investment from foreign-owned multinational corporations into 
Ireland by building scale and excellence in specific research disciplines (DJEI, 2015a) . 
3.1.4.  R&D tax credit 
 While EI, IDA, and SFI are the three state agencies responsible for the public funding 
of innovation in firms, a number of reports by the national government (DoF, 2016; DJEI, 
2015b) and the OECD (OECD, 2015a; OECD, 2014) have highlighted that innovation policy 
in Ireland is heavily skewed towards the use of R&D tax credits. The indirect public funding 
offered by R&D tax credits accounts for approximately 66% of the total public funding for 
innovation implemented in Ireland (DoF, 2016, p. 17).  Therefore, the R&D tax credit is by 
                                                             
6
 For the full range of EI supports, see: https://www.enterprise-ireland.com/en/funding-supports/ 
7
 See IDA: http://www.idaireland.com/docs/annual-reports/2015/annual_report_2015.pdf 
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far the most prominent innovation policy instrument in Ireland in terms of its usage by firms. 
Though the R&D tax credit is available to all firms in Ireland, it is typically claimed by older, 
larger, foreign-owned firms (DoF, 2016). 
3.2. Construction of the dataset 
 To capture these four key features of Ireland’s innovation policy system, our 
empirical analysis is based on firm-level micro-data drawn from a variety of sources. First, 
the Annual Business Survey of Economic Impact (ABSEI) is a large, annual survey collected 
by the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (DJEI) which captures whether firms 
received an R&D tax credit in each year, as well as information on R&D expenditure, firm-
size, sector, and other important information. Second, we access administrative data holdings 
from EI, IDA, and SFI. All data sources capture firm-level information on an annual basis. 
Unlike ABSEI, the administrative data from EI, IDA, and SFI are not surveys, but rather 
populations of all firms that participated in programmes funded by these agencies. 
 ABSEI provides a binary indicator of whether firms received an R&D tax credit from 
the national government in each year. The administrative data from EI and IDA provide 
information on what years firms received payment of an innovation subsidy. We use this 
payments data to construct binary variables taking unit value for every year a firm received a 
subsidy, and zero otherwise. The administrative data from SFI is of a somewhat different 
structure. Here, firms enter into multi-year RJVs. Therefore, we use this information to 
construct a binary variable taking unit value for every year the firm participated in the SFI 
programme, and zero otherwise.  
 Another important feature of the innovation policy system in Ireland is that while all 
firms can receive an R&D tax credit and an EI or IDA subsidy or participate in a SFI RJV at 
the same time, this is not the case with each of the three state agencies. EI supports 
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indigenous firms while IDA supports foreign-owned firms, so by definition no firm will ever 
receive funding from both of these agencies. In addition, though in theory firms could 
participate in SFI programmes and receiving funding from EI or IDA simultaneously, on 
examination of the data the level of overlap is close to zero. Therefore, in our evaluation of 
the degree of consistency in the instrument mix, we analyse three pair-wise combinations, 
R&D tax credits with either: 1) EI subsidies, 2) IDA subsidies, or 3) SFI RJVs.  
 Administrative data from EI covers the period 2006-2014, while data from IDA and 
SFI covers the period 2007-2014. As described above, the nature of the data dictates that 
firms do not receive innovation policy instruments from EI, IDA, or SFI simultaneously. 
Therefore, we merge each of the three administrative datasets from each state agency with 
ABSEI separately to make three final datasets to facilitate our evaluation.  
 The resulting three panel datasets are unbalanced due to entry and exit of firms over 
the time period. However, we have at least two repeat observations on all firms in the sample, 
and approximately 50 percent of the firms are observed in all years. In addition, the response 
rate among surveyed firms in ABSEI is approximately 55-60 percent in each year, meaning 
that the level of overlap between ABSEI and each of the administrative datasets is very high.  
 To facilitate the empirical analysis, we must define four discrete innovation policy 
instrument mix ‘categories’ that account for the interaction effects between each different 
innovation policy instrument: 
1. No EI/IDA/SFI intervention and no R&D tax credit (NEITHER) 
2. No EI/IDA/SFI intervention and receives R&D tax credit (R&DTC) 
3. Receives EI/IDA/SFI intervention and no R&D tax credit (AGENCY) 
4. Receives EI/IDA/SFI intervention and R&D tax credit (BOTH) 
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 Though each pair-wise combination will contain only two different innovation policy 
instruments, this will result in four innovation policy instrument mix variables representing 
each of the four categories. Therefore, even though NEITHER contains no innovation policy 
instrument, and AGENCY and R&DTC contain only innovation one policy instrument each, 
they are both referred to as instrument mix categories.  In addition, these four instrument mix 
categories are mutually exclusive cases (e.g., an observation in category 4 is not also 
recorded in category 2 simply because it has received an R&D tax credit, it must receive both 
EI/IDA/SFI intervention and R&D tax credit together simultaneously to be recorded in 
category 4). 
 While these four categories can be used to evaluate the instrument mix consistency at 
a point in time, we must amend them if we are to capture temporal consistency. As policy 
mix theory shows, the innovation policy instrument(s) firms have been exposed to in the past 
will play a key role in determining how a current instrument mix influences firm-level 
innovation (Flanagan et al., 2011). Therefore, to fully address the dynamics of temporal 
consistency in the innovation policy instrument mix we use these initial four instrument mix 
category variables to construct sixteen instrument mix ‘switch’ variables.  
 In any given year, firms can be in only one of the four instrument mix categories 
defined above. However, the following year firms in each of these four categories have two 
options: 1) stay in the same category; or 2) switch to one of the other three categories 
available. This four by four matrix means that sixteen ‘switch’ variables can be used to define 
the temporal dynamics of the innovation policy instrument mix. These sixteen instrument 
switch categories are defined in Appendix 1. 
3.3. Innovation outcomes 
 ABSEI captures firms’ total expenditure on R&D each year. We divide this amount 
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by the firms’ number of employees to create R&D intensity, and then compute the natural log 
of this variable to standardise the variance. Using R&D intensity as a measure of firm-level 
innovation is common in the literature (e.g., Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Hussinger, 2008; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014). 
3.4. Control variables  
 To control for other possible influences on firms’ R&D intensity, we include several 
variables in our econometric analysis that describe firms’ internal characteristics as well as 
the external business environment in which the firm operates. We include variables indicating 
the percentage of employees that work on in-house R&D activities within the Republic of 
Ireland. We also control for firms’ expenditure on formal structured training for employees 
(divided by number of employees). Based on Eurostat firm-size classifications, we include 4 
dummy variables indicating whether a firm is micro (>10 employees), small (10-49 
employees), medium (50-249 employees) or large (250+ employees).  To control for the 
sector in which the firm operates, we include 6 dummy variables based on Eurostat sectoral 
aggregations indicating whether the firm operated in manufacturing (high-technology; 
medium-high-technology; medium-low-technology; low-technology) or services (knowledge-
intensive; less knowledge-intensive). Location variables are included indicating which of 
Ireland’s three regions the firm is located in: Border, Midlands and Western Region; 
Southern and Eastern Region; or Dublin (capital city). Outside of these internal firm 
characteristics, we include dummy variables for each year of the survey to capture 
information on firms’ external environment. These control variables are the standard ones 
typically used in the literature (e.g., Roper et al., 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014). 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in Table 1. All relevant variables are 
deflated at 2011 prices. 
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3.5. Description of the dataset 
 We first consider the cross-sectional characteristics of our three datasets. Table 2 
shows the proportion of the sample in each category of innovation policy instrument mix. 
Overall, approximately three quarters of the sample do not receive any policy intervention, 
while just under one quarter of the sample receive R&D tax credits. 
 Table 3 presents a transition matrix which demonstrates how firms switch between 
different policy instrument mixes through time. The interpretation of Table 3 can be shown 
by an illustrative example. Take the case of firms in the NEITHER policy instrument mix 
category for the Enterprise Ireland/ABSEI sample. Of the 13,836 firms that were first 
observed in this category, 12,789 (92.43%) stay in this category; while, at some point over 
the time period, 864 (6.24%) switch to receive an R&D tax credit; 160 (1.16%) switch to 
receive an EI subsidy; and 23 (0.17%) switch to receiving BOTH. As described in Section 
3.2, we are using an unbalanced panel of firms with approximately 50% of the sample 
observed in each time period and at least 2 observations on every firm. Therefore, the 
transition of an individual firm between different instrument mix categories can be captured a 
maximum of nine times or a minimum of twice. It is  clear  from  
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Table 3 that firms that begin in the NEITHER category and the R&DTC category tend to 
remain in these categories. 
 Table 3 also highlights a number of important differences between policy instruments 
administered by SFI and those administered by EI or IDA. Firms that receive an EI or IDA 
subsidy as their starting category have a tendency to switch to other policy instrument mix 
categories, particularly NEITHER. This gives an indication of how firms use EI  and  IDA  
subsidies:  they  apply  for  them,  use  them  for  a  specific purpose, but do not continue 
applying for and use them. In contrast to this, firms that receive an SFI RJV as their starting 
category tend not to switch back to NEITHER, but rather remain in the same category or 
switch to BOTH. This likely occurs for two reasons. First,  because all of the  SFI  RJVs  are 
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multi-year collaborations (unlike the EI and IDA subsidies) it makes sense that firms would 
at least stay in the same category. Second, the focus of the SFI policy instrument is on linking 
firms with the national science base in terms of oriented basic and applied research. Given 
that firms entering into RJVs facilitated by SFI will be conducting R&D for a sustained 
period of time, they are a natural complement to R&D tax credits.8 
 As can be seen in Table 4, a clear hierarchy is evident in terms of firms’ R&D 
intensity in each policy instrument mix category. Firms in the BOTH category achieve the 
highest level of R&D intensity, with firms in the R&DTC category only marginally behind 
this. All categories that involve some form of policy instrument outperform firms in the 
NEITHER category by a large distance. Looking at the AGENCY category, firms that 
receive IDA subsidies perform the best. Looking at the BOTH category, firms receiving an 
SFI linkage and an R&D tax credit together have a higher level of R&D intensity than firms 
that combine an EI or IDA subsidy with an R&D tax credit. It should be noted, however, that 
the NEITHER category most likely includes firms that do not even attempt to innovate, 
which may partly explain the much lower levels of R&D intensity of firms in this policy 
instrument mix category. 
 While we cannot infer from Table 4 that BOTH causes higher levels of R&D 
intensity, it is instructive to see the relative innovation performance (as measured by R&D 
                                                             
8
 This point has important implications for the interpretation of our findings, which we highlight in Section 5. 
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intensity) of firms in each policy instrument mix category. To see whether the identified 
‘premium’ associated with BOTH in Table 4 is stable through time, we graph these summary 
statistics in Figures 2, 3 and 4. With the exception of 2008 for firms receiving IDA 
innovation subsidies (Figure 3), there is clear evidence of the hierarchy described in Table 4 
persisting through time. However, the relative R&D intensity of each group is characterised 
by a degree of change through time. The R&D intensity  of  firms  receiving  EI  or  IDA  
subsidies  falls  significantly  in  2011,  and  never recovers to its previous peak.9 Firms 
receiving SFI linkages and R&D tax credits together steadily increase their R&D intensity 
through time relative to all other categories.10 
 In summary, the data lend support to the contention that receiving any combination of 
two policy instruments together is associated with higher R&D intensity. To verify this 
finding from the descriptive statistics, we need to econometrically control for other possible 
influences on firms R&D intensity, and perform a formal test for the existence of 
complementarities between R&D tax credits and EI or IDA subsidies or SFI RJV. To do this, 
we first test for the presence of static complementarities. Following this, we make use of the 
longitudinal nature of our dataset to test for dynamic complementarities. 
3.6. Instrument interactions: Direct test for complementarity, substitution, and 
neutrality 
 We can identify complementarity in the policy instrument mix if receiving one policy 
instrument (i.e. EI subsidy) increases the returns already being achieved with another policy 
instrument (i.e. R&D tax credit). In order to test for complementarity empirically, we adapt 
the econometric method specified by Love at al. (2014) and perform a ‘direct’ test for the 
presence of complementarities, substitution, or neutral instrument interactions by estimating  
                                                             
9
 As was highlighted in Section 3.1, Ireland entered a major economic downturn in 2008 following the 2007 
global financial crisis, which placed significantly pressure on public funding for innovation. 
10
 Given that RJVs are multi-year contracts, they are more insulated from the effects of the recession in Ireland. 
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Figures 3, 4, and 5. R&D intensity by innovation policy instrument mix ‘category’ by year 
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an innovation production function (Athey and Stern, 1998; Mohnen and Röller, 2005; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). The production function approach works by regressing 
mutually exclusive instrument mix dummy variables (defined in Section 3.2), as well as a set 
of control variables, on the natural log of firms’ R&D intensity (the innovation outcome 
variable). Following this, we apply a formal test for both static and dynamic 
complementarity, substitution, and neutrality, as described below. 
3.6.1.  Test for static complementarity, substitution, and neutrality  
 In Equation (1) below, I represents an innovation outcome indicator for firm i, Pi is a 
series of four binary variable indicating which policy instrument mix category firm i belongs 
to, and Xi is a vector of control variables. Therefore, we can write: 
Ii = ȖiPi + ȕXi + İi          (1) 
 Here, Pi can indicate each of the four discrete instrument mix categories outlined in 
Section 3.2. Although there are four potential instrument mix variables, there are only two 
actual policy instruments, P1 and P2, such that the vectors (00), (01), (10), and (11) define all 
possible combinations of the two policy instruments.11 To use the example of the R&D tax 
credit and EI subsidy, (11) represents firms receiving both policy instruments together (i.e. 
BOTH), while (00) represents firms receiving no policy instrument (i.e. NEITHER). 
Following common practice in the literature, estimations of Equation (1) are carried out 
without a constant to display how each of the different policy instrument mix categories 
impacts firms’ R&D intensity, including that of receiving no policy instrument. Static 
complementarity between two innovation policy instruments in the innovation production 
will be observed if Equation (2), below, is satisfied, while static substitution will be observed 
                                                             
11
 See Section 3.2. (00): NEITHER; (01): R&DTC; (10): AGENCY; (11): BOTH. 
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in Equation (3) is satisfied. If neither Equation (2) nor Equation (3) is satisfied, then by 
definition we have identified a neutral relationship. 
I(10, X) + I(01, X) ≤ I(00, X) + I(11, X)       (2) 
I(10, X) + I(01, X) ≥ I(00, X) + I(11, X)       (3) 
 Static complementarity means that receiving two different innovation policy 
instruments simultaneously produces a higher level of firm-level innovation output than the 
sum of the results produced by receiving either innovation policy instrument individually. 
Following Rogge and Reichardt’s (β016) definition of consistency, we can interpret this as 
direct evidence of strong instrument mix consistency, and validation of Hypothesis 1. 
However, if receiving two different innovation policy instruments simultaneously produces a 
lower level of firm-level innovation output than the sum of the results produced by receiving 
either innovation policy instrument individually, we can interpret this as evidence of 
instrument mix inconsistency. If neither static complementarity nor static substitution are 
identified, then by definition the relationship is neutral, and we can interpret this as direct 
evidence of weak instrument mix consistency. 
3.6.2.  Temporal dynamics 
 Even using panel data, testing for static complementarity involves comparing all of 
the observations in the dataset to one another in terms of the innovation policy instrument 
mix they are exposed to at a single point in time. In contrast to this, testing for dynamic 
complementarities involves utilising the longitudinal nature of the dataset to compare repeat 
observations to themselves as they are exposed to different policy instrument mix categories 
through time. Here it is important to bear in mind that testing for complementarities should be 
inherently dynamic because it involves the addition of something new to something the firm 
currently has or does (Love et al. 2014). 
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 Similar to Equation (1), we specify Equation (4) to test for dynamic complementarity, 
substitution and neutrality: 
Ii = ȖiSWi + ȕXi + İi         (4) 
 In Equation (4)12, I represents an innovation outcome indicator for firm i, SWi is a 
matrix of 16 different binary variables representing innovation policy instrument mix 
‘switch’ variables.  See Appendix 1 for the definition of each of these 16 variables.  
 Dynamic complementarity requires that Equation (5) and (6) are satisfied. Equation 
(5) states that firms that switch from the R&DTC category in one year to BOTH in the next 
year have higher level of innovation output than firms that switch from NEITHER in one 
year to receiving AGENCY in the next year (i.e. adding something new to what the firm 
currently has or does). Capturing the temporal dynamics, Equation (6) details the opposite 
sequence.  
swβ4 ≥ sw1γ           (5) 
swγ4 ≥ sw1β            (6) 
 Again, echoing Rogge & Reichardt (2016) definition of consistency, if Equations (5) 
and (6) are verified we can interpret this as evidence of strong instrument mix temporal 
consistency. Similarly, dynamic substitution requires: 
swβ4 ≤ sw1γ           (7) 
swγ4 ≤ sw1β           (8) 
                                                             
12
 As Love et al. (2014) point out, the underlying assumption in the dynamic model is different to that of the 
static model. In the static model, unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be random. In the dynamic model, the 
assumption is that intra-firm dynamics in unobserved heterogeneity are random. 
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 Equations (7) and (8) state that firms that switch from receiving one innovation policy 
instrument in one year to receiving a combination of two innovation policy instruments in the 
next year13 have lower level of innovation output than firms that receive no innovation policy 
instrument in one year, and then switch to receiving one innovation policy instrument in the 
next year. We can interpret this as direct evidence of instrument mix temporal inconsistency. 
If neither dynamic complementarity nor dynamic substitution is identified, then by definition 
the relationship is neutral. We can interpret this as direct evidence of weak instrument mix 
temporal consistency. 
 The dynamic approach allows us to observe how the sequence in which firms receive 
different policy instruments affects innovation outcomes. For example, does receiving an 
R&D tax credit first, followed by an EI subsidy, impact firms R&D intensity differently to 
receiving them in the opposite order? This question has important implications for policy. 
Though different innovation policy instruments may have been designed to be consistent with 
one another ex-ante, they may still interact negatively if the temporal aspect of their 
consistency has not been taken into consideration. Similarly, instrument interactions can 
evolve in an unintended manner as they unfold across different policy mix dimensions. If this 
possibility is bot built into policy evaluation, the ‘wrong’ policy implications may be drawn. 
To unravel this issue, we must map out all of the known temporal dynamics in the policy 
instrument mix and trace the relationship these movements have with firms’ R&D intensity, 
captured by Hypothesis 2. 
3.7. Estimation procedure 
 We estimate Equation (1) and Equation (2) using OLS based estimation methods. 
Some literature has highlighted that two-step estimation models (Athey and Stern, 1998; 
                                                             
13
 Because we are using an unbalanced panel, the ‘next year’ should be taken to mean the nest time period the 
firm is observed in subsequent to the initial observation. 
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Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006) or instrumental variables regression methods (Mohnen and 
Röller, 2005) are superior in terms of accounting for endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, in a detailed review of this literature, Love et al. 2014 have noted 
that, in practice, both of these estimation methods are not applicable with secondary data. To 
be applicable, a primary dataset would have to be designed and collected with the specific 
estimation procedure in mind. As outlined in Section 3.2, evaluating the innovation policy 
instrument mix tends to require merging a variety of different secondary data sources 
together to capture the required number of policy instrument variables, and retain sufficient 
information on their underlying characteristics. Therefore, these methods are not applicable 
in this instance. This issue is common in the literature, and we follow the standard practice 
applied in previous literature (e.g., Bourke and Roper, 2016; Love et al., 2014; Roper and 
Arvanitis, 2012; Roper et al., 2008).  
4. Results 
 The consistency of an instrument mix can be defined as how well different instrument 
in the mix are aligned with one another (Reichardt and Rogge, 2016). This can be 
conceptualised in two different ways: 1) a state of the instrument mix at a point in time, and 
2) the process of how this consistency was achieved through time (Rogge and Reichardt, 
2016). Below, we first present an evaluation of the state of instrument mix consistency by 
performing a static test for complementarity, substitution, and neutrality in instrument 
interactions. Following this, we analyse the process element of consistency by examining 
temporal dynamics. 
4.1. Static instrument mix consistency 
 Table 5 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) for static complementarity, 
substitution,  and  neutrality.   When  comparing   coefficients,  as   might  be    expected,   all 
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innovation policy instrument mix categories that involve receiving at least one innovation 
policy instrument   are   superior   to   receiving   no   innovation   policy   instrument   (i.e. 
R&DTC, AGENCY, and BOTH). The hierarchy of instrument mixes described in Section 3.5 
is maintained in terms of EI and IDA subsidies and SFI RJVs having a lower impact on 
firms’ R&D intensity in absolute terms. However, unlike the summary statistics provided in 
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Table 3 above, only firms which receive an R&D tax credit combined with an IDA subsidy 
(i.e. BOTH) outperform firms that receive an R&D tax credit alone (i.e. R&DTC).  
 By itself, this result does not indicate that BOTH is a superior innovation policy 
instrument mix category for IDA sponsored firms, and inferior for those supported by EI and 
SFI. To determine this, we must perform the formal tests for static complementarity and 
substitution outlined in Equations (2) and (3). As indicated in the final row of Table 5, the 
null hypothesis of no complementarity cannot be rejected in any case, including that of firms 
receiving an R&D tax credit and an IDA subsidy together. In fact, in all cases we find 
evidence of substitution and thus instrument mix inconsistency. Therefore, we can reject 
Hypothesis 1, that when firms receive a combination of two different innovation policy 
instruments simultaneously there will be a complementary relationship between them in their 
impact on firm-level innovation. 
 This finding would appear to lend support to Flanagan et al.’s (β011: 708) claim that 
“[i]t seems highly unlikely that, regardless of theoretical complementarities, 
complementarities in practice can be achieved by the simple accumulation of instrument after 
instrument. At some point theoretically complementary instruments may begin to interact in 
negative or contradictory ways if layered one upon the other”. However, it is important to 
bear in mind the dynamic nature of complementarity and how this should be incorporated 
into evaluations of the instrument mix. In this regard, Love et al. (2014: 1174) highlight that 
“[t]wo discrete activities are (Edgeworth) complementary if adding one activity increases the 
returns from doing the other. This implies that the benefit of adding a new activity depends 
not simply on what the firm currently does, but on what it did in the past: it concerns adding 
something to an existing strategy”. Therefore, we must also test the temporal dynamics of the 
instrument mix to verify this finding. 
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4.2. Temporal dynamics of instrument mix consistency  
 Table 6 presents the results from estimating Equation (4). As described in Section 3.2, 
we now have sixteen innovation policy instrument mix ‘switch’ variables that represent firms 
either moving between instrument mix categories or remaining in the same category (for a 
detailed description, see Appendix 1). The coefficients on each of these instrument mix 
variables can be interpreted as being relative to the option of remaining in the NEITHER 
category. However, as highlighted in Table 2, the exception to this is in the case of 
SFI/ABSEI dataset, where the category SW32 has no observations. Therefore, in this case, 
we set SW32 as the reference category and include SW11 in the regression. The only 
negative coefficient is the case of SW11 in the SFI/ABSEI regression. This negative result is 
as expected, because it captures the impact of firms remaining in the NEITHER category 
relative to switching from receiving an SFI linkage and no other policy instrument in one 
year, to receiving an R&D tax credit and no other policy instrument in the following year (i.e. 
SWγβ). The coefficients in Table 6 show that there is a universally positive ‘premium’ on 
receiving any individual policy instrument (i.e. SW22, SW33) or combination of policy 
instruments (i.e. SW44) relative to remaining in the NEITHER category.  
 However, as was highlighted in Section 3.6.2, our primary interest is not the absolute 
values of the policy instrument mix coefficients, but rather to test whether switches between 
certain policy instrument mixes have a greater impact on firms’ R&D intensity than others. 
This involves testing for the inequality embodied in Equations (5) and (6) for dynamic 
complementarity and Equations (7) and (8) for dynamic substitution. 
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 In the final six rows of Table 614, we first test for dynamic complementarity. We find 
that in the first case (i.e. SW24>SW13) the null hypothesis of no dynamic complementarity is 
rejected. However, in the second case (i.e. SW34>SW12), the null hypothesis of no dynamic 
complementarity cannot be rejected. Following this, our tests for dynamic substitution reveal 
the same pattern of results. These results clearly demonstrate the crucial role temporal 
dynamics play in the innovation policy instrument mix. This also highlights the important 
role the sequence in which firms receive the innovation policy instruments plays a 
moderating role in this complementary relationship. 
5. Discussion and implications for policy 
 The empirical component of this paper serves to demonstrate the applicability of the 
conceptual framework developed in Section 2.5. Applying this conceptual framework to the 
empirical setting of Ireland, we were able to investigate how the temporal dynamics of the 
innovation policy instrument mix affected its impact on firms’ R&D intensity. Our results 
from testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 highlight the vital role temporal dynamics play in 
moderating interaction effects within the innovation policy instrument mix. This finding has 
important implications for policy and the practice of evaluation.  
 Testing for complementarity and substitution at a point in time, we find strong 
evidence of static substitution between all instrument mix combinations. However, when 
taking the temporal dynamics into consideration and testing for dynamic complementarity 
and substitution, we find evidence that some temporal dynamics lead to complementarity 
while others lead to substitution. It is important to note that, by themselves, these results do 
not indicate instrument mix inconsistency and the rejection of Hypothesis 2. Rather, these 
                                                             
14
 Give that we now have sixteen innovation policy instrument mix ‘switch’ variables instead of the four 
innovation policy instrument mix ‘category’ variables in Table 5, the control variables have been omitted from 
Table 6 for brevity. Results from the control variables can be viewed in Appendix 2. 
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results require a nuanced interpretation based on policy mix theory and the system features of 
the empirical setting.  
 As was demonstrated in Table 3, some instrument mix combinations happen very 
rarely. Firms that receive an EI or IDA subsidy in one year tend not to receive a combination 
of the EI or IDA subsidy together with an R&D tax credit in the next year. This switch occurs 
a total of 14 times for EI firms and 3 times for IDA firms. In contrast to this, the opposite 
sequence is relatively common. This is likely because the R&D tax credit is an automatic 
innovation policy instrument, while EI and IDA subsidies are awarded on a competitive and 
selective basis. Therefore, it is understandable that receiving an R&D tax credit in one period 
and switching to receive a combination of the R&D tax credit with an EI or IDA subsidy or a 
SFI RJV in the next period is a much more common observation. However, these sequencing 
effects are not picked up by conducting a static test. Therefore, rather than indicating 
instrument mix inconsistency, results from the testing Hypothesis 1 (i.e. the static test) should 
serve to highlight the danger of not taking temporal dynamics into consideration when 
conducting instrument mix evaluations. Where switches are common, we find direct evidence 
of dynamic complementarity and thus strong instrument mix consistency, thus supporting 
Hypothesis 2. 
 In this sense, the results of any innovation policy instrument mix evaluation should 
not be treated as ‘absolute’, but rather dependent on context. For example, the time period our 
dataset corresponds to captures the 2008 global financial crisis, which was particularly acute 
in the Irish economy and had lasting effects for many years. This means that the temporal 
dynamics are particularly important to include in the model for evaluation. In this context, 
our results when testing for dynamic complementarity demonstrate a surprisingly high degree 
of robustness in the innovation policy system. Despite an unfavourable business environment 
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characterised by lack of access to credit15 and high firm mortality rate16, we still find 
evidence of a high degree of temporal consistency among innovation policy instruments. 
Evaluations conducted using cross-sectional data, or not specifically incorporating temporal 
dynamics into their econometric model, would likely arrive at the ‘wrong’ implication for 
policy.  
 Therefore, from a policy perspective, this inaccurate policy implication could be used 
as evidence to discontinue certain innovation policy instruments. Similarly, state agencies 
responsible for awarding innovation funding could be instructed not to award funding to a 
firm already receiving a different innovation policy instrument where an inconsistent 
relationship had been identified using a static test. This would lower the effectiveness and 
efficiency of innovation policy overall, as well as hamper policy learning. By using the 
concept of consistency and testing for directly static and dynamic complementarity and 
substitution, we are able to directly identify these important temporal dynamics which would 
be obscured using a different theoretical and econometric method. 
6. Conclusion and recommendations for future research  
 Around the world, significant public finances are devoted to funding firm-level 
innovation. However, the effective and efficient allocation of these scarce public resources is 
hampered by the policy complexity inherent in dynamic multi-actor, multi-level, and multi-
scalar innovation systems. The concept of policy mix has emerged and gained a prominence 
in the literature as a means of mitigating or circumventing the limitations imposed by policy 
complexity. This paper contributed to the literature by synthesising a number of different 
stranded in the policy mix literature to establish a conceptual framework for the ex-ante and 
ex-post impact evaluation of innovation policy instrument mixes. Applying this framework to 
                                                             
15
 See CSO: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/atf/accesstofinance2014/ 
16
 See CSO: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/bd/businessdemography2014/ 
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a unique empirical setting using a novel microeconometric procedure, we demonstrate its 
usefulness to the field as a set of ‘guiding principals’ for instrument mix evaluation. 
However, this application of the conceptual framework only represents the first step towards 
gaining a more full understanding the nature of real world innovation policy instrument 
mixes how they leads to firm-level innovation additionality. Therefore, we highlight a 
number of avenues for future research. 
 The most immediate extensions are based on data availability. Firstly, though our 
dataset facilitates a comprehensive analysis of the different innovation policy instruments 
available to firms, it is limited in that we only have one indicator of firms’ innovation 
outcomes. We need to move beyond measuring innovation solely as input additionality and 
examine the impact of the innovation policy instrument mix on output and behavioural 
additionalities. Secondly, it is not sufficient to only know the impact of the innovation policy 
instrument mix on firm-level innovation, but rather we also need to know what the impact of 
this firm-level innovation is on economic indicators such as exports, productivity, and 
employment growth. As highlighted by Rogge and Reichardt (2016), finding a dataset that is 
comprehensive enough to conduct this kind of analysis, while still capturing sufficient 
information on the underlying characteristics of each policy instrument, poses a major 
challenge to policy mix research. Therefore, it would likely require merging multiple detailed 
economic surveys to construct a dataset that captures all of this information. 
 Finally, there are two additional avenues that future research could usefully pursue in 
terms of extending the econometric method. All of the tests for complementarity we have 
conducted here have been between pairs of innovation policy instruments available to firms 
from the national government. However, it is also likely that firms receive innovation policy 
instruments from the supra-national level of government. For example, firms may be exposed 
to a policy instrument mix consisting of R&D tax credits and Enterprise Ireland subsidies 
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from the national government in addition to Horizon 2020 funding from the EU. 
Theoretically, this would involve a test on the joint inequality of multiple coefficients, as 
opposed to the pairwise test conducted here. To the authors’ knowledge, joint inequality 
testing has never been conducted in the policy evaluation literature previously, but it is the 
next logical methodological step for future research to pursue. 
 In this paper we have unravelled the much of what is known and the unknown 
concerning the innovation policy instrument mix. Focusing on the crucial underlying role 
played by consistency among innovation policy instruments, we have laid out a more holistic 
set of ‘guiding principals’ for impact evaluation on the instrument mix. While this paper 
represents the first step towards a more full understanding of the policy mix, future research 
can build of these foundations to move the field close to fulfilling Flanagan et al.’s (β011: 
711) call for innovation policy studies “to move towards substantial empirical innovation 
policy histories … of policy mixes” (emphasis in original). 
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